No. 83-1687.United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.Argued November 8, 1984.
Decided January 22, 1985.
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Thomas H. Blaske (argued), Ann Arbor, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants.
George W. Steel, Detroit, Mich., for Schmidt.
Lee T. Hoffmann, Jr. (argued), Southfield, Mich., for M B Prop.
James Lugari, pro se.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Before MERRITT, WELLFORD and MILBURN, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
[1] In this diversity action under Michigan tort law, the plaintiffs, Julio Margain, his wife Anna and daughter Analuz, claimed damages for injuries resulting from a fight between Julio and defendant, James Lugari. After a jury verdict awarding a combined amount of $40,000 to the plaintiffs, the District Court entered judgment apportioning separately the damages suffered by each plaintiff among the three defendants rather than imposing joint liability. Plaintiffs contend that the District Court’s judgment is contrary to Michigan law because it splits up the damages among joint tortfeasors according to their relative fault. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for the entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. I.
[2] The Margains are citizens of Mexico. On the night of January 2, 1981, Julio and his daughter Analuz were paying guests at the Campus Inn, an Ann Arbor, Michigan, hotel owned by defendant, Maize and Blue Properties. On this same evening, defendant Cyclon Industries rented the Regency Ballroom in the Campus Inn from 6:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. for an office party. At approximately 11:00 P.M., several of the partygoers, including defendant Jim Lugari, an employee of Cyclon, continued the party at the Presidential Suite on the fifteenth floor. The Campus Inn had provided liquor at the ballroom (where there was an open bar), and also delivered liquor to the suite. After going to the suite, Lugari had at least four scotch and waters.
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[6] Plaintiffs proposed a judgment under which they would recover their total damages with each defendant jointly and severally liable for the entire amount.[2] The District Court rejected this proposal as inconsistent with the jury verdict, since the jury had allocated liability for each plaintiff’s damages among the three defendants. JA, 29. Judge Joiner ruled that because the “case involved discrete acts of negligence” by each defendant, it was “not unreasonable that the jury should allocate responsibility as it did.” JA, 29. [7] The District court accordingly entered a judgment assessing $10,000 in damages against Cyclon, $10,000 against Maize and Blue, and $20,000 against Lugari. JA, 21-22. Judge Joiner again stated that the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that the acts of Lugari and Maize and Blue were “discrete and not concurrent and caused damages separately assessable,” and that some of Lugari’s acts were outside the course of his employment with Cyclon. JA, 19.II.
[8] The question on appeal is whether the District Court was correct in concluding that the jury “might reasonably” have found facts which under Michigan law permit apportionment of damages. Michigan is a comparative negligence state, but it has not accepted the rule set forth in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N Y2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972), under which liability may be apportioned among joint tortfeasors based upon their relative fault. Instead, the longstanding rule in Michigan is that those whose acts concurrently cause a single indivisible injury are jointly and severally liable, and damages may be apportioned only if the plaintiff has suffered factually separable or divisible injuries that can be allocated among the tortfeasors with reasonable certainty. Sexton v. American Aggregates, 60 Mich. App. 524, 231 N.W.2d 449, 454-455 (1975). Where two or more actors concur in producing a single indivisible injury, such persons are jointly and severally liable even if they do not act in concert. Gorelick v. Department of State Highways, 172 Mich. App. 324, 339 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1983), citin Edwards v. Joblinski, 108 Mich. App. 371, 310 N.W.2d 385 (1981) (apportionment denied among negligent automobile drivers and road commission found negligent for failing to properly maintain a yield sign).[3]
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reasoning in Gorelick v. State Department of Highways, supra,
by clearly stating that “each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is the legal cause of harm to another is liable to the other for the entire harm.” Since the jury found that Maize and Blue’s negligent failure to take reasonable care to protect Julio and Analuz was a legal cause of their harm, Maize and Blue is liable for the entire harm. As Lugari’s employer, Cyclon’s liability was vicarious, and on the facts here, there is no logical basis for any division of damages between Cyclon and Lugari. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 52, at 315 (4th ed. 1971).
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability as between themselves only and without affecting the rights of the injured party to a joint and several judgment:
(a) Their relative degree of fault shall be considered.
(Emphasis in original). MICH.COMP.LAWS ANN. § 600.2925b (Supp. 1983).